Before the advent of the Annales, Krzysztof Pomian once wrote,

the gaze of the historian [was directed] towards extraordinary events . . . historians resembled collectors: both gathered only rare and curious objects, disregarding whatever looked banal, everyday, normal . . . History was an idiographic discipline, having as its object that which does not repeat itself.¹

History was . . . Pomian speaks in the past tense here, as is probably accurate in the case of social history, but certainly not for its literary counterpart, where the collector of rare and curious works, that do not repeat themselves, exceptional—and which close reading makes even more exceptional, by emphasizing the uniqueness of exactly this word and this sentence here—is still by far the dominant figure. But what would happen if literary historians, too, decided to ‘shift their gaze’ (Pomian again) ‘from the extraordinary to the everyday, from exceptional events to the large mass of facts’? What literature would we find, in ‘the large mass of facts’?

All questions that occurred to me some years ago, when the study of national bibliographies made me realize what a minimal fraction

of the literary field we all work on: a canon of two hundred novels, for instance, sounds very large for nineteenth-century Britain (and is much larger than the current one), but is still less than one per cent of the novels that were actually published: twenty thousand, thirty, more, no one really knows—and close reading won’t help here, a novel a day every day of the year would take a century or so . . . And it’s not even a matter of time, but of method: a field this large cannot be understood by stitching together separate bits of knowledge about individual cases, because it isn’t a sum of individual cases: it’s a collective system, that should be grasped as such, as a whole—and the graphs that follow are one way to begin doing this. Or as Fernand Braudel put it in the lecture on history he gave to his companions in the German prison camp near Lübeck:

An incredible number of dice, always rolling, dominate and determine each individual existence: uncertainty, then, in the realm of individual history; but in that of collective history . . . simplicity and consistency. History is indeed ‘a poor little conjectural science’ when it selects individuals as its object . . . but much more rational in its procedures and results, when it examines groups and repetitions.²

A more rational literary history. That is the idea.

I

The quantitative approach to literature can take several different forms—from computational stylistics to thematic databases, book history, and more. For reasons of space, I will here limit myself to book history, building on work originally done by McBurney, Beasley, Raven, Garside and Block for Britain; Angus, Mylne and Frautschi for France; Zwicker for Japan; Petersen for Denmark; Ragone for Italy;

Martí-Lopez and Santana for Spain; Joshi for India; and Griswold for Nigeria. And I mention these names right away because quantitative work is truly cooperation: not only in the pragmatic sense that it takes forever to gather the data, but because such data are ideally independent from any individual researcher, and can thus be shared by others, and combined in more than one way. Figure 1 (overleaf), which charts the take-off of the novel in Britain, Japan, Italy, Spain and Nigeria, is a case in point. See how similar those shapes are: five countries, three continents, over two centuries apart, and it’s really the same pattern, the same old metaphor of the ‘rise’ of the novel come alive: in twenty years or so (in Britain, 1720–40; Japan, 1745–65; Italy, 1820–40; Spain, 1845 to early 1860s; Nigeria, 1965–80), the graph leaps from five–ten new titles per year, which means one new novel every month or two, to one new novel per week. And at this point, the horizon of novel-reading changes. As long as only a handful of new titles are published each year, I mean, novels remain unreliable products, that disappear for long stretches of time, and cannot really command the loyalty of the reading public; they are commodities, yes—but commodities still waiting for a fully developed market. A new novel per week, by contrast, is already the great capitalist oxymoron of the regular novelty: the unexpected that is produced with such efficiency and punctuality that readers become unable to do without it. The novel ‘becomes a necessity of life’, to paraphrase the title of a book by William Gilmore-Lehne, and the jeremiads that immediately multiply around it—novels make readers lazy, stupid, dissolute, insane, insubordinate: exactly like films two centuries later—are the clearest sign of its symbolic triumph.

II

The rise of the novel, then; or, better, one rise in a history which had begun many centuries earlier, and will go through several other accelerations, as emerges quite clearly from the data on the publication
**Figure 1: The rise of the novel, 18th to 20th century**

To enrich our literary chronicles with a few new historical ingredients … would be pointless: it’s the presuppositions which must change, and the object transform itself. To abolish the individual from literature! It's a laceration, clearly, even a paradox. But a literary history is possible only at this price.

Roland Barthes, ‘History or Literature?’

of new novels in Britain between 1710 and 1850 (figure 2). Here, three phases seem to stand out, each subdivided into a first period of rapid growth and a second one of stabilization, and each modifying in a specific way the social role of the novel. The first phase, from 1720 to around 1770, is the one discussed above: a leap in 1720–40, and a consolidation in the following decades. In the second phase, which runs from 1770 to around 1820, the further increase in the number of new titles induces for its part a drastic reorientation of audiences towards the present. Up to then, I mean, the ‘extensive’ reading so typical of the novel—reading many texts once and superficially, rather than a few texts often and intensely—would easily outgrow the yearly output of titles, forcing readers to turn to the past for (much of) their entertainment: all sorts of reprints and abridgements of eighteenth-century bestsellers, British as well as foreign,
plus the old, and even the few ancient classics of the genre. But as the total of new novels doubles, compared to the previous phase—80 in 1788; 91 in 1796; 111 in 1808—the popularity of old books suddenly collapses, and novelistic audiences turn resolutely (and irreversibly) towards the current season.³

The third phase, which begins around 1820, and which unfortunately I can only follow for the first thirty years, is the one in which the internal composition of the market changes. So far, the typical reader of novels had been a ‘generalist’—someone ‘who reads absolutely anything, at random’, as Thibaudet was to write with a touch of contempt in _Le liseur de romans_.⁴ Now, however, the growth of the market creates all sorts of niches for ‘specialist’ readers and genres (nautical tales, sporting novels, school stories, _mystères_): the books aimed at urban workers in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, or at boys, and then girls, in the following generation, are simply the most visible instances of this larger process, which culminates at the turn of the century in the super-niches of detective fiction and then science fiction.

Abstract models for literary history . . . and we certainly have abstraction here: _Pamela, The Monk, The Wild Irish Girl, Persuasion, Oliver Twist_—where are they? five tiny dots in the graph of figure 2, indistinguishable from all others. But graphs are not really _models_; they are not simplified, intuitive versions of a theoretical structure in the way maps and (especially) evolutionary trees will be in the next two chapters.

³ ‘In Italy,’ writes Giovanni Ragone, ‘in the first twenty years of the nineteenth century virtually all the bestsellers of the previous century disappear’, _Italia 1815–1870_, in _Il romanzo_, vol. III, pp. 343–54. A similar shift seems to occur in France, where, however, the caesura of the revolution offers a very strong alternative explanation. The ‘pastness of the past’ is of course the key message of the two genres—gothic, and then historical novels—most responsible for the turn towards the present.
⁴ Albert Thibaudet, _Il lettore di romanzi_ [1925], Napoli 2000, p. 49.
Quantitative research provides a type of data which is ideally independent of interpretations, I said earlier, and that is of course also its limit: it provides data, not interpretation. That figure 2 shows a first ‘rise’ (when the novel becomes a necessity of life), and then a second (the shift from the past to the present), and then a third (the multiplication of market niches), seems to me a good account of the data, but is certainly far from inevitable. Quantitative data can tell us when Britain produced one new novel per month, or week, or day, or hour for that matter, but where the significant turning points lie along the continuum—and why—is something that must be decided on a different basis.

III

A—multiple—rise of the novel. But with an interesting twist, which is particularly visible in the Japanese case of figure 3 (overleaf): after the rise from one novel per month in the mid-1740s to one per week twenty years later (and even more in the following years: between 1750 and 1820, in fact, many more novels are published in Japan than in Britain; a fact which deserves a good explanation)—several equally rapid downturns occur in 1780–90, the 1810s to the 1830s, and in 1860–70. The fall of the novel. And the reason behind the downturns seems to be always the same: politics—a direct, virulent censorship during the Kansei and Tempo periods, and an indirect influence in the years leading up to the Meiji Restoration, when there was no specific repression of the book trade, and the crisis was thus probably due to a more general dissonance between the rhythm of political crises and the writing of novels. It’s the same in Denmark during the Napoleonic wars (figure 4, overleaf), or in France and Italy (better, Milan) in comparable situations (figure 5, overleaf): after 1789, the publication of French novels drops about 80 per cent; after the first Risorgimento war, the Milanese downturn is around 90 per cent, with only 3 novels published in the course of 1849, against 43 in 1842.
Towards the end of the Tempo era (1830–44) commercial publishing came under . . . a legislative onslaught [which] started with a ban on woodblock prints depicting kabuki actors or courtesans . . . The light fictions known as gokan were also banned, on the grounds that the plots and illustrations were closely related to the kabuki theater and indulged in luxury colour covers and wrappers. Authors were urged instead to write uplifting tales of filial piety and chastity, both of which were somewhat alien to the traditions of popular literature . . . The principal literary victim of the new regime of enforcement was the genre of romantic novels known as ninjobon.

Peter Kornicki, The Book in Japan

[Matsudaira] Sadanobu saw popular fiction as harmful to public morality, especially when authors took ill-concealed potshots at government . . . To assure that publishers and authors took him seriously, in 1783 [Sadanobu's] censors made an example of Santo Kyoden, one of the most popular fiction writers of the day, convicting him of violating the law and handcuffing him for fifty days.

Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan

**Figure 4: The fall of the novel: Denmark**

[Graph showing the decline of new novels in Denmark from 1800 to 1825.]


**Figure 5: The fall of the novel: France, Italy**

The novel has an uncertain relation to politics and social movements. Radical writers have usually chosen shorter and more public forms, writing plays, poems, journalism and short stories. Novels take time . . . The great novels of the revolutionary movements that erupted around 1937 often did not appear until the 1950s and 1960s, when the political energies of the movements had receded.


[Graph showing the decline of new novels in France and Italy from 1760 to 1860.]

The only exception I know to this pattern is the import of British books into India charted by Priya Joshi (figure 6), which rises sharply after the 1857 rebellion; but as Joshi points out, the logic of a colonial relationship is reversed, and the peak is a sign of Britain suddenly accelerating the pace of symbolic hegemony; then, once the crisis is over, the flow returns to its pre-1857 levels.

IV

An antipathy between politics and the novel. Still, it would be odd if all crises in novelistic production had a political origin: the French downturn of the 1790s was sharp, true, but there had been others in the 1750s and 1770s—as there had been in Britain, for that matter,
notwithstanding its greater institutional stability. The American and the Napoleonic wars may well be behind the slumps of 1775–83 and 1810–17 (which are clearly visible in figure 2), write Raven and Garside in their splendid bibliographic studies; but then they add to the political factor ‘a decade of poorly produced novels’, ‘reprints’, the possible ‘greater relative popularity . . . of other fictional forms’, ‘a backlash against low fiction’, the high cost of paper . . . ⁵ And as possible causes multiply, one wonders: what are we trying to explain here—two unrelated individual events, or two moments in a recurring pattern of ups and downs? Because if the downturns are individual events, then looking for individual causes (Napoleon, reprints, the cost of paper, whatever) makes perfect sense; but if they are parts of a pattern, then what we must explain is the pattern as a whole, not just one of its phases.

The whole pattern; or, as some historians would say, the whole cycle: ‘An increasingly clear idea has emerged . . . of the multiplicity of time’, writes Braudel in the essay on longue durée:

Traditional history, with its concern for the short time span, for the individual and the event, has long accustomed us to the headlong, dramatic, breathless rush of its narrative . . . The new economic and social history puts cyclical movement in the forefront of its research . . . large sections of the past, ten, twenty, fifty years at a stretch . . . Far beyond this . . . we find a history capable of traversing even greater distances . . . to be measured in centuries . . . the long, even the very long time span, the longue durée. ⁶

⁶ Fernand Braudel, ‘History and the Social Sciences. The longue durée’, in On History, Chicago 1980, p. 27. The first extended treatment of economic cycles was of course Nikolai Kondratiev’s The Long Wave Cycle, written between 1922 and 1928.
Event, cycle, *longue durée*: three time frames which have fared very unevenly in literary studies. Most critics are perfectly at ease with the first one, the circumscribed domain of the event and of the individual case; most theorists are at home at the opposite end of the temporal spectrum, in the very long span of nearly unchanging structures. But the middle level has remained somewhat unexplored by literary historians; and it’s not even that we don’t work within that time frame, it’s that we haven’t yet fully understood its specificity: the fact, I mean, that cycles constitute *temporary structures within the historical flow*. That is, after all, the hidden logic behind Braudel’s tripartition: the short span is all flow and no structure, the *longue durée* all structure and no flow, and cycles are the—unstable—border country between them. Structures, because they introduce repetition in history, and hence regularity, order, pattern; and temporary, because they’re short (ten, twenty, fifty years, this depends on the theory).

Now, ‘temporary structures’ is also a good definition for—genres: morphological arrangements that last in time, but always only for some time. Janus-like creatures, with one face turned to history and the other to form, genres are thus the true protagonists of this middle layer of literary history—this more ‘rational’ layer where flow and form meet. It’s the regularity of figures 7 and 8 (overleaf), with their three waves of epistolary novels from 1760 to 1790, and then gothic novels from 1790 to 1815, and then historical novels from 1815 to the 1840s. Each wave produces more or less the same number of novels per year, and lasts the same 25–30 years, and each also rises only after the previous wave has begun to ebb away (see how the up- and downward trends intersect around 1790 and 1815). ‘The new form makes its appearance to replace an old form that has outlived its artistic usefulness’, writes Shklovsky, and the decline of a ruling genre seems indeed here to be the necessary precondition for its successor’s take-off. Which may explain those odd ‘latency periods’ in the early history of genres: *Pamela* is published in 1740, and *The Castle of Otranto* in 1764, but very few epistolary or gothic novels are written until 1760
Figure 7: British hegemonic forms, 1760–1850

The anomaly constituted by the epistolary novel's slump in the 1770s is only apparent, and easily explained: what declines in those years is the publication of all novels, and in fact, as figure 8 shows, epistolary novels were then even more hegemonic on the market—as in 1776, when an impossible 71 per cent of new titles were novels in letters.

New novels per year. Sources: For the epistolary novel: James Raven, 'Gran Bretagna 1750–1830', in Il romanzo, vol. 111, pp. 311–12. For the gothic novel: Maurice Lévy, Le roman 'gothique' anglais, Paris 1995. For the historical novel, I have taken as the basis the checklist provided by Rainer Schöwerling ('Sir Walter Scott and the Tradition of the Historical Novel before 1814', in Uwe Böker, Manfred Markus, Rainer Schöwerling, eds, The Living Middle Ages, Stuttgart 1989), and subtracted those texts that also appear in Lévy’s bibliography of the gothic; for the later period, I have also used Block, The English Novel, 1740–1850.
**Figure 8: Market quotas of British hegemonic forms, 1760–1850**

All works of art, and not only parodies, are created either as a parallel or an antithesis to some model. The new form makes its appearance not in order to express a new content, but rather to replace an old form that has already outlived its artistic usefulness.

Viktor Shklovsky, *A Theory of Prose*

As more and more novels are published every year, the hegemony of a single genre tends to become less and less absolute: whereas epistolary novels amounted to 30 per cent or more of the market for twenty-five years (and over 50 per cent in the late 1770s), gothic novels only passed the 30 per cent mark for a few years, otherwise hovering around 20 per cent, and historical novels did even worse: all signs of the growing fragmentation of the market into distinct niches which I mentioned earlier. (A full computation of print runs and reprints may however alter this general picture.)

Percentage of novels published, 3-year average.
and 1790 respectively. Why the lag? Almost certainly, because as long as a hegemonic form has not lost its ‘artistic usefulness’, there is not much that a rival form can do: there can always be an exceptional text, yes, but the exception will not change the system. It’s only when Ptolemaic astronomy begins to generate one ‘monstrosity’ after another, writes Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, that ‘the time comes to give a competitor a chance’—and the same is true here: a historical novel written in 1800, such as *Castle Rackrent* (or in 1805, like *Waverley’s* abandoned first draft) simply didn’t have the incredible opportunity to reshape the literary field that the collapse of the gothic offered *Waverley* in 1814.\(^7\)

\(^7\) A few more words on why a form loses its ‘artistic usefulness’ and disappears. For Shklovsky, the reason is the purely inner dialectic of art, which begins in creative estrangement, and ends in stale automatism: ‘Each art form travels down the inevitable road from birth to death; from seeing and sensory perception, when every detail in the object is savoured and relished, to mere recognition, when form becomes a dull epigone which our senses register mechanically, a piece of merchandise not visible even to the buyer.’ (The passage is from an article collected in *The Knight’s Move*, and is quoted by Victor Erlich in *Russian Formalism*, New Haven 1935, p. 252.) This journey ‘down the inevitable road from birth to death’ can however also be explained by focusing, not so much on the relationship between the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ versions of the same form, but rather on that between the form and its historical context: a genre exhausts its potentialities—and the time comes to give a competitor a chance—when its inner form is no longer capable of representing the most significant aspects of contemporary reality. At which point, either the genre loses its form under the impact of reality, thereby disintegrating, or it turns its back to reality in the name of form, becoming a ‘dull epigone’ indeed. (I develop this point in the appendix to the new edition of *The Way of the World*, “A useless longing for myself”: The crisis of the European *Bildungsroman*, 1898–1914”, London 2000.) But we will soon see another, more draconian explanation for the disappearance of forms.
seem indeed to follow a rather regular ‘life-cycle’, as some economists would call it. These genres—or all genres? Is this wave-like pattern a sort of hidden pendulum of literary history?

Here, the gathering of data is obviously crucial, and I decided to rely entirely on other people’s work: since we are all eager to find what we are looking for, using the evidence gathered by other scholars, with completely different research programmes, is always a good corrective to one’s desires. So, first Brad Pasanek, at Stanford, and then I, consulted over a hundred studies of British genres between 1740 and 1900; there were some dubious cases, of course, and some (not very significant) disagreements in periodization; and although this is still very much work-in-progress, especially at the two ends of the temporal spectrum, the forty-four genres of figure 9 provide a large enough set to support some reflections.

Forty-four genres over 160 years; but instead of finding one new genre every four years or so, as a random distribution would have it, over two thirds of them cluster in just thirty years, divided in six major bursts of creativity: the late 1760s, early 1790s, late 1820s, 1850, early 1870s, and mid–late 1880s. And the genres also tend to disappear in clusters: with the exception of the turbulence of 1790–1810, a rather regular changing of the guard takes place, where half a dozen genres quickly leave the scene, as many move in, and then remain in place for twenty-five years or so. Instead of changing all the time and a little at a time, then, the system stands still for decades, and is then ‘punctuated’ by brief bursts of invention: forms change once, rapidly, across the board, and then repeat themselves for two–three decades: ‘normal literature’, we could call it, in analogy to Kuhn’s normal

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8 When specialists disagreed, I always opted for the periodization arising out of the more convincing morphological argument: in the case of industrial novels, for instance, I followed Gallagher rather than Cazamian, although the latter’s periodization of 1830–50 would have fitted my argument much better than Gallagher’s 1832–67. For details, see ‘A Note on the Taxonomy of the Forms’, p. 31.
Figure 9: British novelistic genres, 1740–1900

For sources, see 'A Note on the Taxonomy of the Forms', page 31.
science. Or think of Jauss’s ‘horizon of expectations’: a metaphor we tend to evoke only ‘negatively’ (that is to say, when a text transcends the given horizon), but which these graphs present instead, ‘positively’, for what it is: figures 7–8 showing how difficult it actually is to transcend the hegemonic horizon, figure 9 presenting the multiple horizons active at any given moment, and so on.

VI

Normal literature remains in place for twenty-five years or so . . . But where does this rhythm come from? Shklovsky’s hypothesis (however modified) cannot explain it, because the connexion between the decline of an old form and the rise of a new one implies nothing about the regularity of the replacement. And widespread regularity: not just the few hegemonic genres, but (almost) all genres active at any given time seem to arise and disappear together according to some hidden rhythm.

The simultaneity of the turnover, at first sight so uncanny, is probably the key to the solution. When one genre replaces another, it’s reasonable to assume that the cause is internal to the two genres, and historically specific: amorous epistolary fiction being ill-equipped to capture the traumas of the revolutionary years, say—and gothic novels being particularly good at it. But when several genres disappear together from the literary field, and then another group, and so on, then the reason has to be different, because all these forms cannot have run independently and simultaneously into insoluble problems—it would be simply too much of a coincidence. The causal mechanism must thus be external to the genres, and common to all: like a sudden, total change of their ecosystem. Which is to say: a change of their audience. Books survive if they are read and disappear if they aren’t; and when an entire generic system vanishes at once, the likeliest explanation is that its readers vanished at once.
This, then, is where those 25–30 years come from: generations. Not a concept I am very fond of, actually, but the only one that seems to make sense of figure 9. And indeed, in Mannheim’s great essay of 1927, the best evidence for his thesis comes precisely from the aesthetic sphere: ‘a rhythm in the sequence of generations’, he writes, following Mentré’s Les générations sociales, published a few years earlier,

is far more apparent in the realm of the séries libres—free human groupings such as salons and literary circles—than in the realm of the institutions, which for the most part lay down a lasting pattern of behaviour, either by prescriptions or by the organization of collective undertakings, thus preventing the new generation from showing its originality . . . The aesthetic sphere is perhaps the most appropriate to reflect overall changes of mental climate.\(^9\)

Overall changes of the mental climate: the five, six shifts in the British novelistic field between 1740 and 1900. But since people are born every day, not every twenty-five years, on what basis can the biological continuum be segmented into discrete units? Mannheim again:

Whether a new generation style emerges every year, every thirty, every hundred years, or whether it emerges rhythmically at all, depends entirely on the trigger action of the social and cultural process . . . We shall therefore speak of a generation as an actuality only where a concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic destabilization.\(^10\)

A bond due to a process of dynamic destabilization; and one who was eighteen in 1968 understands. But again, this cannot possibly explain the regularity of generational replacement, unless one assumes—absurdly—that the ‘destabilizations’ themselves occur punctually every twenty-five or thirty years. And so, I close on a note


\(^10\) Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 303, 310.
of perplexity: faute de mieux, some kind of generational mechanism seems the best way to account for the regularity of the novelistic cycle—but ‘generation’ is itself a very questionable concept. Clearly, we must do better.\footnote{A possible solution: at some point, a particularly significant ‘destabilization’ gives rise to a clearly defined generation, which occupies centre stage for 20–30 years, attracting within its orbit, and shaping after its mould, slightly younger or older individuals. Once biological age pushes this generation to the periphery of the cultural system, there is suddenly room for a new generation, which comes into being simply because it can, destabilization or not; and so on, and on. A regular series would thus emerge even without a ‘trigger action’ for each new generation: once the generational clock has been set in motion, it will run its course—for some time at least. (This is in fact Mentré’s approach to the problem, especially in the long chapter in which he sketches an unbroken series of generations throughout French literature from 1515 to 1915.)}

\footnote{A first look at French literature from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century suggests that most of its narrative genres have a similar 30-year span: pastoral and heroic novels, the nouvelle historique, romans galants and contes philosophiques, sentimental novels, the Bildungsroman, the roman gai, the two main phases (‘heroic’ and ‘sentimental’) of the roman-feuilleton... On the other hand, Sandra Guardini Vasconcelos and other Brazilian literary historians have pointed out that when a country imports most of its novels, the regular turnover of the Anglo-French generations is replaced by a much more accelerated and possibly uneven tempo. If they are right—and I think they are—then the Western European case would once more be the exception rather than the rule of world literature.}

VII

Normal literature remains in place for a generation or so... It's the central group of figure 10, which rearranges the forty-four genres according to their duration, and where about two thirds of them last indeed between 23 and 35 years.\footnote{The one large exception is formed by those genres—nine years, ten, twelve—on the left end of the spectrum: why so short-lived? Almost certainly, because of politics again: Jacobin, anti-Jacobin, evangelical novels around the turn of the century,
**Figure 10: British novelistic genres, 1740–1915 (duration in years)**

In this figure, the most striking exception are the eighty years of Katherine Sobba Green’s periodization for ‘courtship novels’. However, for most historians (and in part for Green herself) this genre goes through two quite distinct phases: the first from 1740 to 1780, dominated by the transcendent principle of chastity, and the second from 1780 (or, better, 1782, when Burney, in Cecilia, abandons the epistolary form) to 1820, dominated by the fundamentally immanent notion of manners. If one accepts this distinction, the anomaly disappears.

For sources, see ‘A Note on the Taxonomy of the Forms’, page 31.
Chartist and religious narratives in the 1840s, New Woman novels in the 1890s... And as often happens with politics and the novel, the outcome is a string of explicit ideological declarations: Jacobin novels trying to reform their villains by ‘discussion and reasoning’, as Gary Kelly puts it; Right Reason, adds Marilyn Butler in Jane Austen and the War of Ideas: a ‘puzzling’ choice, she goes on, the great ‘missed opportunity’ of the Jacobin novel as a form. Missed opportunity, yes, but puzzling, perhaps not: if a novel wants to engage the political sphere directly, a series of unambiguous statements, however narratively dull, is a perfectly rational choice. And then, ideological exchanges are an easy way to capture Braudel’s ‘dramatic rush of the event’: to turn a book into *A tale of the times, A tale of the day, The philosophy of the day*, to quote some typical 1790s subitles. But the conjunction of course works both ways: if what most attracts readers is the drama of the day, then, once the day is over, so is the novel...

Why did most British genres last 25–30 years, then, but some of them only ten? Because these ‘political’ forms subordinated narrative logic to the tempo of the short span, I have conjectured, and thus they also disappeared with the short span; and I hope the answer sounds plausible. But the real point, here, is less the specific answer, than the total heterogeneity of problem and solution: to make sense of quantitative data, I had to abandon the quantitative universe, and turn to morphology: evoke form, in order to explain figures. Here, the figures of the literary market. But when I studied the international impact of American films, I encountered exactly the same problematic: in the sample decade (1986–95), comedies amounted to 20% of the top box office hits within the United States, whereas elsewhere, as figure 11 shows, they were a lot less successful (especially in Asia and in the Mediterranean). The figures were crystal clear. But if one then

wondered *why* this was so—why, in other words, comedies were so much harder to export than, say, action films—percentages offered no help, and the explanation had to be sought once again in the realm of form: as contemporary comedies make large use of jokes, which are often lost in translation, American comedies are quite simply a lot less funny in Japanese or Egyptian or Spanish than in English. (Not for nothing, the great international age of comic films—Chaplin, Keaton, Lloyd, Laurel and Hardy—coincided with silent cinema.)\(^4\)

\(^4\) See here how a quantitative history of literature is also a profoundly formalist one—especially at the beginning and at the end of the research process. At the end, for the reasons we have just seen; and at the beginning, because a formal concept is usually what makes quantification possible in the first place: since a series must be composed of homogeneous objects, a morphological category is needed—'novel', 'anti-Jacobin novel', 'comedy', etc—to establish such homogeneity.
Quantification poses the problem, then, and form offers the solution. But let me add: if you are lucky. Because the asymmetry of a quantitative *explanandum* and a qualitative *explanans* leaves you often with a perfectly clear problem—and no idea of a solution. In ‘Planet Hollywood’, for instance, it turned out that absolutely all Italian box office hits of the sample decade were comedies; why that was so, however, was completely unclear. I felt I had to say something, so I presented an ‘explanation’, and NLR indulgently printed it; but it was silly of me, because the most interesting aspect of those data was that I had found a problem for which I had absolutely no solution. And problems without a solution are exactly what we need in a field like ours, where we are used to asking only those questions for which we already have an answer. ‘I have noticed,’ says Brecht’s Herr Keuner, ‘that we put many people off our teaching because we have an answer to everything. Could we not, in the interest of propaganda, draw up a list of the questions that appear to us completely unsolved?’

IX

Two brief theoretical conclusions. The first is again on the cycle as the hidden thread of literary history. ‘For the elevation of the novel to occur’, writes William Warner in * Licensing Entertainment*, ‘the novel of amorous intrigue must . . . disappear’; it is ‘the Great Gender Shift’ of the mid-eighteenth century, adds April Alliston: the disappearance of earlier fiction by women writers, with the related increase in the number of male novelists. And it’s all true, except for the article: the shift? The third quarter of the nineteenth century, write Tuchman and Fortin in * Edging Women Out*, was ‘the period of invasion’ of the novelistic field by male authors, who eventually ‘edge out’ their female competitors.15

But, clearly, a mid-Victorian ‘invasion’ presupposes a reversal of the gender shift of the 1740s. And, in fact, this is what the historical record shows: if between 1750 and 1780, as a result of the initial shift, men publish indeed twice as many novels as women, in the late 1780s a second shift reverses the gender ratio, as one can see in Garside’s breakdown for a slightly later period (figure 12, overleaf), in which women novelists (among them Burney, Radcliffe, Edgeworth, Austen) remain the majority until a third shift occurs, around 1820, towards male writers (Scott; then Bulwer, Dickens, Thackeray), to be followed by a fourth shift back to women in mid-century (the Brontës, Gaskell, Braddon, Eliot), and then by a fifth one—the ‘edging out’—in the 1870s. Similar data are beginning to emerge for France, Spain, the us, and it’s fascinating to see how researchers are convinced that they are all describing something unique (the gender shift, the elevation of the novel, the gentrification, the invention of high and low, the feminization, the sentimental education, the invasion . . .), whereas in all likelihood they are all observing the same comet that keeps crossing and recrossing the sky: the same literary cycle, where gender and genre are probably in synchrony with each other—a generation of military novels, nautical tales, and historical novels à la Scott attracting male writers, one of domestic, provincial and sensation novels attracting women writers, and so on.

Now, let me be clear, saying that these studies describe the return of the same literary cycle is not an objection: quite the opposite, my thesis depends on their findings, and it even corroborates them somehow, by finding the common mechanism which is at work in all those instances. But it’s also true that if one reframes individual instances as moments of a cycle, then the nature of the questions changes: ‘Events don’t interest Lucien Febvre for what in them is unique’, writes Pomian, but ‘as units in a series, which reveal the conjunctural variations in . . . a conflict that remains constant throughout the period.’

Figure 12: Authorship of new novels, Britain 1800–1829: gender breakdown (percentage)

The 1810s show an even clearer pattern of female dominance, with women novelists out-producing their male counterparts in every year, and accounting for over 50 per cent of titles in six out of the eight years between 1810 and 1817... As these figures indicate, the publication of Jane Austen’s novels was achieved not against the grain but during a period of female ascendancy. It is noticeable that Scott’s earliest historical novels were launched when male authorship of fiction was at a lower than usual ebb.

Peter Garside, ‘The English Novel in the Romantic Era’

Variations in a conflict that remains constant: this is what emerges at the level of the cycle—and if the conflict remains constant, then the point is not who prevails in this or that skirmish, but exactly the opposite: no victory is ever definitive, neither men nor women writers ‘occupy’ the British novel once and for all, and the form keeps oscillating back and forth between the two groups. And if this sounds like nothing is happening, no, what is happening is the oscillation, which allows the novel to use a double pool of talents and of forms, thereby boosting its productivity, and giving it an edge over its many competitors. But this process can only be glimpsed at the level of the cycle: individual episodes tend, if anything, to conceal it, and only the abstract pattern reveals the true nature of the historical process.\footnote{A comparable oscillation is probably at work between High and Low forms, whose simultaneous existence is a well-known, if often ignored, fact of novelistic history: from the Hellenistic beginnings (divided between ‘subliterary’ and ‘idealized’ genres) through the Middle Ages, the seventeenth century (the Bibliothèque Bleue, and aristocratic novels), eighteenth (Warner’s pair of ‘entertainment’ and ‘elevation’), nineteenth (feuilletons, railway novels—and ‘serious realism’), and twentieth century (pulp fiction—modernist experiments). Here, too, the strength of the novel is not to be found in one of the two positions, but in its rhythmical oscillation between them: the novel is not hegemonic because it makes it into High Culture (it does, yes, but it’s so desperately professorial to be awed by this fact), but for the opposite reason: it is never only in High Culture, and it can keep playing on two tables, preserving its double nature, where vulgar and refined are almost inextricable.}

X

Do cycles and genres explain everything, in the history of the novel? Of course not. But they bring to light its hidden tempo, and suggest some questions on what we could call its internal shape. For most literary historians, I mean, there is a categorical difference between ‘the novel’ and the various ‘novelistic (sub)genres’: the novel is, so to speak, the substance of the form, and deserves a full general
theory; subgenres are more like accidents, and their study, however
interesting, remains local in character, without real theoretical con-
sequences. The forty-four genres of figure 9, however, suggest a
different historical picture, where the novel does not develop as a
single entity—where is ‘the’ novel, there?—but by periodically gen-
erating a whole set of genres, and then another, and another . . .
Both synchronically and diachronically, in other words, the novel is
the system of its genres: the whole diagram, not one privileged part of
it. Some genres are morphologically more significant, of course, or
more popular, or both—and we must account for this: but not by pre-
tending that they are the only ones that exist. And instead, all great
theories of the novel have precisely reduced the novel to one basic
form only (realism, the dialogic, romance, meta-novels . . .); and if
the reduction has given them their elegance and power, it has also
erased nine tenths of literary history. Too much.

I began this chapter by saying that quantitative data are useful because
they are independent of interpretation; then, that they are challeng-
ing because they often demand an interpretation that transcends the
quantitative realm; now, most radically, we see them falsify existing
theoretical explanations, and ask for a theory, not so much of ‘the’
novel, but of a whole family of novelistic forms. A theory—of diversity.
What this may mean, will be the topic of my third chapter.
A NOTE ON THE TAXONOMY OF THE FORMS

The genres of figures 9 and 10 are listed below in the following way: current definition (in capitals); dates of beginning and end; and critical study from which I have drawn the chosen (and not always explicit) periodization. Since both figures are meant as a first panorama of a very large territory, soon to be improved by further work, a few words of caution are in order. First, except for the (rare) cases in which quantitative data or full bibliographies are available, the initial date refers to the genre’s first recognizable example rather than to its genuine take-off, which occurs usually several years later; as our knowledge improves, therefore, it is likely that the chronological span of novelistic genres will turn out to be significantly shorter than the one given here. On the other hand, a few genres experience brief but intense revivals decades after their original peak, like the oriental tale in 1819–25, or the gothic after 1885, or the historical novel (more than once). How to account for these Draculaesque reawakenings is a fascinating topic, which however will have to wait for another occasion. Finally, the chart shows neither detective fiction nor science fiction; although both genres achieve their modern form around 1890 (Doyle and Wells), and undergo a major change in the 1920s, in step with the overall pattern, their peculiar long duration seems to require a different approach.
